Finance | G Pontin

ACE – Procurement in PPFM

This paper is the third in ACE’s infrastructure investment series and explores in more detail improvement that could be made to the procurement within Public and Private Finance Models (PPFM).

Issues explored in this paper include the concept of flexibility, transparency and the use of a centralised resource to improve procurement efficiency and reactiveness, resulting in better overall value for money for the taxpayer.

The paper explores and has recommendations in the following areas:

There needs to be clear guidance on model suitability
Centralised efficiency and skills retention are important
The two broad procurement phases, provide limited information or confidence to the market
Implementing a Procurement Efficiency Mechanism (PEM)
There needs to be improved accountability
Procurement issues expand beyond that of Public Private Finance Models
Design and exploratory work can save time and money
Flexibility is required for government to gain better efficiency and value for money
Provide a baseline, creating a fixed operational performance will provide certainty
Dynamic operational performance, providing capacity and efficiency beyond the baseline

Company website:
http://www.acenet.co.uk/

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ACE – Public Private Finance Model: moving forward

This paper is the second in ACE’s infrastructure investment series and explores in more detail the rationale, performance and market conditions that surround Public and Private Finance Models (PPFM).

This paper explores a number of flexible models that should help to improve public and private sector performance. Whilst, encouraging the level of private finance required to improve the UK’s aging infrastructure. Importantly, improving the models through which private finance is encouraged into infrastructure investment is key to providing savings for the taxpayer.

The PFI model is in need of review by government following the financial crisis. A number of factors have changed, such as the higher cost and lower availability of capital. This has in turn called into question value for money, the relative cost of the public sector undertaking the project and attracting further investment into primary (greenfield/new build) projects.
However, the National Audit Office (NAO)3 has previously found that there are some positives that can be taken forward from the PFI miodel. For example:“Sixty nine per cent of PFI projects reported delivering to the contracted timetable in 2008.”“Ninety four per cent of projects responding to our 2008 survey were reported to have been delivered on, or less than five per cent over, price”
There needs to be greater flexibility built within models to allow a more efficient application to a wider set of scenarios. The PFI model has shown that there is an interest from the private sector. Areas such as construction risk can be improved, the financial crisis and the subsequent shift in attitudes away from higher risk projects have highlighted the need for the model to be improved.
This paper outlines five Public Private Finance Models (PPFM) that aim to improve the prospects of private financing, its performance and value for money going forward.

Company website:
http://www.acenet.co.uk/

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ACE – Performance of PFI: 1996 – 2010: lessons learned

This paper is the first of a new series of infrastructure financing papers from ACE. It looks at 15 years of Private Finance Initiative experience in the UK. The paper establishes the lessons learnt, both positive and negative, that must inform new thinking on project financing if the public and private sectors, and most importantly the taxpayer, is to get the best possible value for money earnings and policy.

Key findings:

Reviewing the PFI model
PFI’s lack of public trust demonstrates that there needs to be a clear and transparent link between capital liabilities, operational liabilities and the expected rates of return for private companies within financing public projects.
Within the review of the PFI procurement model Government must look to retain the benefits that a successfully procured PFI project can deliver as it develops new financing models.
The focus of the debate must be to develop a successful public-private model moving forward, ensuring efficient investment in the UK’s long term economic growth.
The effect of the recession and financial crisis:
The financial crisis and recession have had a significant effect on the financial sector. Lending has been constrained, confidence between banks, consumers and business has been shaken.
There have been significant changes in the cost of capital; the cost of government borrowing; the difference between the two; the private sector’s ability to raise funds; and attitudes to risk. These factors call into question the assumptions within the PFI model, resulting in a weaker less sustainable case for its usage.
New issuance in a range of primary debt markets, global issuance of leveraged loans and issuance of high-yield corporate debt have all undergone a challenging year in 2011. This means it has been harder for companies to raise funding.
The financial crisis has changed attitudes to risk, with companies moving towards cash rich positions, paying off debt and re-enforcing balance sheets. This has fed through into the PFI model, with fewer companies able to take on the risks, and raise the finances required to make projects successful.
A continuing aversion to risk will impact on the long term growth and investment potential of projects in the UK from the private sector. however, it is important to recognise that attitudes to risk are also aligned with the pricing of finance. For example, the recent decision of RWE and EON to abandon their UK nuclear build programme shows how difficult it is to raise finance given
uncertainty with regards to risks, earnings and policy.

Company website:
http://www.acenet.co.uk/

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ACE – Introducing competition into the water market

This paper has been produced by ACE to explore the potential of regulatory and market reforms within the water sector.

In particular this paper looks to address the relatively low levels of consumer competition, supply competition, the inadequate levels of investment and the environment under which investment takes place.

To resolve some of these issues the paper makes the following recommendations for the government’s water white paper, suggetsing it should consider:

Introducing competition into the consumer and supplier markets by allowing private companies to run and compete in these areas;

Creating of an independent (ownership unbundled) network system operator(s);

Requiring non-discriminatory third party access to the network from network system operators;

Allowing price signals to guide investment;

Breaking the current investment cycle, allowing network investment to occur over longer periods according to detailed investment plans, whilst companies that own private water producing/treatment facilities invest on a rolling basis given market price signals and consumer needs;

Creating conditions that would allow new entrants to enter the market, and create competition between existing water suppliers. For example, companies outside of the water sector may wish to enter to provide bundled services (gas, electricity and water);

Putting in place regulatory conditions that create an easy switching environment, to encourage switching rates;

and having the water regulator oversee the operation of the market and ensure competition and standards are met, rather than directly setting investment and consumer pricing signals.

Company website:
http://www.acenet.co.uk/

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ACE – Signals to invest

There has recently been an increased level of debate as to how the structure of the railways operates and the manner in which franchises are provided. Whilst this paper does not look at the franchise mechanism itself it does pose the question as to how we could further incentivise train operating companies (TOCs) to invest in the system on which they operate.

Most franchises in Great Britain are awarded by the Department for Transport (DfT), following an invitation to tender. Companies that tender do so according to a number of service criteria and targets that are outlined by the DfT to be achieved during day-to-day operation.

However, as with most regulated industries the franchise model is not without its flaws. Some companies perform well, others do not. There have been instances of fare increases significantly above the rate of inflation, with questionable service provision and improvements taking place. There is also anecdotal evidence that the confusing terms and conditions and negotiations within the franchise system making performance achievement hard to measure and value hard to judge.

Part of the reason for such occurrences is a reduced willingness to improve an infrastructure asset which the TOC does not own.

As we have seen from the government‟s recent announcements in the Comprehensive Spending Review, the level of subsidy provided to the companies that operate these franchises is due to fall, and fares rise. This will not please rail users unless service levels continue to improve and investment continues to take place to upgrade Britain‟s ageing rail network.

The questions once again arise: are franchise companies willing to invest in the network, are they able to invest in the network, and are they willing to make these investments given the current length of the franchise agreements and that they do not receive the full market return for the investment that takes place?

There is a willingness among TOCs to invest in physical assets. Virgin, for example, has bid for the design, build and operate contract for the new Tampa to Orlando high speed line in Florida. Train operators in the UK have invested in station refurbishment, while alternative models (such as “adopt-a-station”

schemes) have been applied to harness alternative resources and community efforts.

Other solutions have been proposed which include lengthening franchises to encourage franchise operators to take a long term view of investment, or privatising the system allowing all decisions to be made on a cost/profit basis with ownership of the asset under private hands. However, privatisation holds the potential for the formation of an uncompetitive monopoly and brings into question how the asset is treated in terms of its national efficiency, importance and strategic value.

Ways in which such investment issues could be alleviated include creating regulatory frameworks which incentivise investment (effectively subsidising the TOC) and extending the term of franchises to extend the period under which a return is made.

As well as the financial issues explored in this paper, there may be other obstacles to bringing private investment into the physical rail network. These include issues of planning law, compulsory purchase mechanisms and regulatory and procurement processes, all of which would impact private sector efforts to build new railway infrastructure. This paper only considers the financial mechanisms by which investments could be encouraged.

Company website:
http://www.acenet.co.uk/

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ACE – Infrastructure: a case for funding 2010

This report from ACE aims to review and analyse a range of material that is openly available (such as economic papers, cost benefit analysis and case study evidence) in an attempt to ascertain what effect infrastructure investment has on the economy. This paper will not however go into the mechanisms that would fund such projects but attempt to demonstrate the scale of potential the contributions the construction and infrastructure sector could make.

The economic rationale behind investment decisions has not been as important as it is during this economic cycle given the recent recession, tightening credit conditions and proposed public sector cuts. Projects need to demonstrate that they will improve the future growth prospects of the UK.

The return upon infrastructure investment was found to vary significantly not only between projects, but also across countries. Theory suggests that achieving a positive economic effect from investment relies on the current level of provision in respect to that of the optimal (equilibrium level), maintaining the long run competitiveness of the economy, investor certainty, access to capital, accounting for externalities and market failure, and creating a conducive regulatory environment.

Company website:
http://www.acenet.co.uk/

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Moffatt Associates – EU Wholesale Markets Study

To execute this study Moffatt Associates conducted what is probably one of the most extensive surveys of energy market participants ever undertaken.

The aims of the study were to identify and evaluate key factors impacting on the liquidity and efficiency or EU wholesale electricity and gas markets. Between mid-January and early May 2008, MA devised and conducted a major market research programme. Given the diverse and varied nature of wholesale energy markets, MA decided to employ a two-stage research methodology involving (a) the use of face-to-face discussions to identify and weight the relative importance of key commercial and policy issues impacting on the operation of wholesale energy markets, and (b) following this with a more detailed survey across a wider market sample to obtain quantitative and qualitative feedback on a range of specific issues arising from the face-to-face discussions.

This involved:

In-depth interviews and discussions with (20) senior executives representing all relevant EU stakeholder associations
Nine focus groups held in Brussels, Milan, Madrid, Copenhagen, London and Vienna, involving a total of 113 market participants
An online questionnaire to illicit quantitative responses – a total of 150 market participants completed the questionnaire

Company website:
http://www.moffatt-associates.com/

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